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Abstract 
 
This study examines the application of the co-evolution literature to strategic 
alliance formation in SME‟s in the UK and Australia in two differing industries at 
different stages of the industry life-cycle. Extending the framework developed by Das 
and Teng (2002) and that of Wilson and Hynes (2009), it engages with wider industry 
and environmental characteristics present in these two countries, specifically examining 
whether different theories of alliance formation are better suited to different stages of an 
industry life cycle. The issues discussed above are explored and developed through the 
use of a qualitative case study approach using empirical evidence from SME‟s in the UK 
and Australia in two differing industries.  Findings indicate strong resource-based drivers 
for alliance formation in both industries, with firms dependent on the co-evolution of 
their alliances and indeed selected by the results of their alliance participation.  However, 
differences emerge in the strategic use of alliances in these two industries.  The influence 
of the stage of the industry life cycle on this is discussed. 
 
Key words: Co-evolution; industry life-cycle; case study; strategic alliances; 
organizational strategy. 
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Co-evolutionary dynamics in strategic alliances: the influence of the industry 
lifecycle  
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
Industry dynamics impacts firm strategy and survival, and understanding which firms 
will succeed and whether firms should compete or cooperate at different stages of the 
industry life cycle is important both to managers and to theorists.  Most literature about 
firm strategy and performance approaches this issue by examining the strategy, and 
performance of single firms.  Yet with the increasing reliance on strategic alliances and 
networks, firms are also increasingly dependent on other firms for their own 
performance; a better understanding of how firms behave and change simultaneously is 
therefore crucial.  Co-evolution (where species change at the same time to mutual 
advantage) has long been documented and argued within the scientific academic 
community and has recently been applied to industry [1,2,3,4,5].  
 
This study briefly reviews the current research on co-evolution in industry, and 
examines the application of this theory to the way in which firms form, perform, compete 
and change within alliance relationships. The importance of the industry life cycle is 
examined to explore whether co-evolution is a better explanation of change at certain 
stages of the industry life cycle.  A framework outlining the key environmental factors 
affecting alliance formation and change, together with an assessment of how well co-
evolution is being seen at each stage of the industry life cycle is developed. These issues 
are developed through the use of a qualitative case study approach using empirical 
evidence from SMEs in the UK and Australia in two differing industries. This paper 
extends the work of Volberda and Lewin [3] who extensively critiqued the use of single-
theme explanations for explaining the adaption and selection of firms and strongly called 
for the need for joint outcomes of intentional adaptation, and that of Wilson and Hynes 
[5] which delineated the underlying constructs and assumptions of evolution and co-
evolution in greater depth. Pyka [6] also explicitly suggests that a better understanding of 
alliance formation over the different stages of the ILC is essential.  
 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1  Strategic Alliances 
 
Strategic alliances include a wide range of cooperative relationships [7] covering 
a variety of contractual forms from joint equity ventures to contracts and less formal 
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working agreements.  Over the last two decades there has been unprecedented growth in 
the number of these inter-firm alliances [8,9]. Some of this change towards co-operative 
structures has been stimulated by the increased globalization of markets, decreasing 
product life-cycles and increasing rate of technological development. This proliferation 
of strategic alliances has been accompanied by an increasing stream of research by 
scholars who have examined many of the causes and consequences of alliance formation 
[10,11].  
Traditional models of firm behavior are difficult to apply to this co-operative 
behavior [7,12] although theories previously used to understand strategic alliance 
formation include transaction cost economics [13,14]; resource based theory [15,16]; and 
social structural explanations [17,18].  Whilst these are useful at explaining the reasons 
why organizations form alliances, they do not account for the mechanisms of change 
during the lifetime of the alliance.   There is an increasing research stream focused on 
alliance developmental processes, although the understanding of these remains quite 
limited [1,2,19].  For example, although alliances are known to be highly unstable [1] it is 
still relatively unclear how, and why, change within alliances occurs and whether theories 
such as co-evolution would provide a better explanation of this change. Forming and 
competing using strategic alliances may change the way in which firms change, and 
compete, as well as changing the unit of selection from a single firm to possibly including 
the strategic alliance partner(s).  
 
2.2 Co-evolution and Strategic Alliances  
 
Early work using co-evolution as an explanatory factor for change focused solely on 
the interaction between a firm and the environment [20,21], and the resultant 
simultaneous change was considered co-evolutionary. In addition, although the 
mechanism of change was proposed as co-evolutionary, the focus of this work was 
primarily on the firm as the unit of selection.  
 
Later work considered that for co-evolution to occur the change need not be between 
firm and environment, but could also occur within two firms or between firms and 
strategic alliances. Applying the theory of co-evolution to better understand change in 
firms and their strategic alliances assumes that change may occur in either the dyad of 
alliance partners or in the alliance-partner dyad simultaneously. The complexity of 
strategic alliances and their “parent” firm results in each element evolving separately as 
well as co-evolving interactively [1] and for co-evolution to occur, the population should 
consist of heterogeneous firms that have learning capabilities and are able to mutually 
influence each other; yet very few empirical articles exist examining co-evolutionary 
change [3]. 
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Whilst change can be co-evolutionary, the unit of selection as a result of this change has 
generally been considered to be the individual firm [22]. Although Wilson and Hynes  [5] 
introduce the notion of simultaneous success or failure of two or more firms as a result of 
co-evolution, prior research has generally focused on a single firm’s advantage being 
brought about by simultaneously changing with the environment or other firms; few if 
any studies addressed the advantage conferred on the dyad or group as a result of co-
evolution. Various studies of strategic alliances have included a time dimension [23,24], 
yet Koza and Lewin [2], argue that “singularly absent from the literature are studies of 
the evolution of alliances over time, as they co-evolve with the changing strategies of 
firm, evolving industry strategic practices and the changing regulatory and institutional 
environment.” (pp. 258).   They argue that alliances are not only embedded within the 
strategy portfolio of each partner, but importantly the wider environmental 
characteristics.  
 
This adaptive co-evolutionary response to a changing environment can therefore be 
framed within the industry lifecycle framework. To date, relatively little attention has 
been paid to whether firms co-evolve and survive differently at differing points of their 
life cycle.   Furthermore it is not well understood whether a firm is, at various times of its 
life cycle subject to such upheaval, that a strategy of co-evolution reduces its risk, and 
hence increases its survival rate. Alternatively, if co-evolution occurs in some firms and 
strategic alliances within an industry, then this might in turn affect the selection criteria 
of the remaining population within this industry.  
 
  2.3  The Industry Lifecycle Framework and Strategic Alliances 
 
 The industry lifecycle framework (ILC) describes the evolution of an industry, 
including progressive stages of growth, maturity and decline. Proponents of the 
framework argue that industry characteristics at each stage require an appropriate 
organisational structure, decision-making process and strategy.  The life cycle literature 
has largely focused predominantly on firms entering or exiting an industry [25,26], and 
largely on the assumption that firms enter the market alone, compete alone and are 
selected alone.  Williamson [14] built on Schumpeter‟s [27] early work, which described 
the industry life cycle as several stages including the early or exploratory stage, an 
intermediate development stage, and a mature stage with periods of destabilised change 
in between.   
 
This context influences the nature and extent of a firm‟s external resource needs 
and resource acquisition behaviour [28,29].  Although Covin and Slevin [30] suggested a 
strong link between management practices and industry life cycle, suggesting that the 
strategic posture or overall competitive orientation of firms changes over the firm life 
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cycle, it is not well understood whether a firm is, at various times of its life cycle more 
likely to form strategic alliances although the motivations for forming alliances may also 
be different at different stages of the industry life cycle. Van den Bosch et al [31] suggest 
that at varying life cycle stages the knowledge absorptive capacity of firms change and 
that firms in turbulent (as often seen in emerging) industry environments are more likely 
to dedicate efforts to increasing their absorptive capacity, which could include forming 
strategic alliances.  
 
The early or emerging stage typically has a high degree of uncertainty and the 
primary focus of this stage is the growth of the firm; thus whilst technology is developing 
and no clear standards or platforms are adopted in the market, alliances might be formed 
to access technology. Indeed the emerging stage of an industry is shaped by uncertainty; 
in technology, in the market, and in terms of setting behavioural norms [32]. Work on 
emerging industries tends to confirm the idea that there are a high number of small firms 
at the early stages of industry development, and that after some time of technological and 
market adjustment, the industry reaches some degree of legitimacy [32,33].  
 
Streams of literature on emerging technologies tend to focus on the overall adoption of a 
technology rather than the growth and selection of firms but also suggest that the 
adoption of certain standards or norms will lead to the selection of firms which have 
adopted this standard [35]. In fact “keeping a foot in the door” for new technologies has 
long been seen as a motivating factor for large incumbent technology firms to form many 
strategic alliances with small firms in emerging technologies because they believe that by 
retaining options in each of the new emerging technologies, they will effectively be co-
selected for the winning technology [35,36].  Whilst ILC research has often focused on 
the importance of technology as the key influential force, the strategic alliance literature 
is rich with explanations of cooperative strategies in emerging industries (biotechnology, 
computing etc). Pyka [6] suggests that strategic alliances in emerging industries are very 
closely linked to technological emergence. However other research has found the focus 
of alliances in emerging industries to be only partially focused on technology, with access 
to new markets and finance equally important [37].  
 
Firms often work co-dependently at this stage, often as a result of resource 
deficiency and the process of working together in a rapidly changing environment can 
result in concurrent change within the organizations. Thus, it would seem that at 
emerging stages of an industry, where many small players enter the field, along with a 
small number of larger firms, co-evolution may be a better explanation for change, and 
co-selection is a better explanatory variable than evolution and individual selections. 
Likewise, the rapid change and high levels of uncertainty together with resource co-
dependence mean that firms may be selected together for success or failure, therefore: 
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P1.  The success or failure of firms in the emerging period of an industry life 
cycle is best explained by co-evolution and co-selection. 
 
Klepper [25] suggests that innovation is higher in the initial phase of an industry 
life cycle, followed by a period of “shakeout”. This period of shakeout is often when 
many firms fail. This intermediate stage is the time at which marketing and 
manufacturing techniques are sharpened and at this point in the life cycle, the focus of 
alliance might be motivated towards more marketing focused alliances.  These 
established firms and industries have been the focus of most strategy literature; these are 
firms which scan and interact with their environment, but can set their own strategy and 
are selected for on their own characteristics. Much of the mainstream strategy literature 
[38,39] focuses on this market stage and is based on the managerial assumptions of firms 
setting strategy as a result of environmental scanning and firms being selected for at 
individual level. Baum and Singh [40] suggest this to be a form of diffuse co-evolution 
which is explained as concurrent changes occurring but as a result of one or more firms 
evolving in response to one or more other populations or their environments, but not 
direct co-evolution. Therefore:  
 
P2. The success or failure of firms in the growth and maturity stages of an 
industry life cycle are best explained by the theory of evolution and individual 
firms as the unit of selection.  
 
Finally industries in decline are typified by a market demand that is relatively 
static, or reducing, concurrent to the number of number of active firms reducing. At this 
point, for example, complete supply chains may be selected for simultaneously; 
companies supplying the wrong firm at the final end of the supply chain may fail at the 
same time as this firm fails. There is little chance for these firms to find other markets for 
their products or services as the structures supporting the market are already established 
and relationships mature. Mergers and acquisitions are frequent at this stage of the life 
cycle [25]. In addition, companies within the supply chain, or previous competitors may 
work together at this time to ensure that the group is selected for, rather than the 
individual firm. The overall market size may decrease or remain stable, therefore the only 
strategy for growth is increasing market share [25]; and firms may envisage advantages 
to collaboration in terms of access to declining markets, therefore: 
  
P3. The success or failure of firms in the declining stage of an industry life cycle 
is best explained by co-evolution and co-selection.  
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The characteristics of the different industry life cycle stages and the implications 
for co-evolutionary research are presented in a summary framework in Table 1.  The grey 
sections refer to the propositions outlined above which are explored in the case studies 
presented.  
 
Table 1. Framework for Coevolution within the Industry Life cycle 
 
 Introduction Growth Maturity Decline 
Industry 
Population 
Population 
unstable;  Many 
small firms with 
high need for 
venture capital 
Population remains 
unstable and 
growing rapidly but 
rules of competition 
beginning to be 
established; 
Shakeout of firms 
Firms compete 
intensively as market 
stablises. Several 
dominant firms 
dominate the market 
Population unstable 
and declining in 
number 
Industry 
structure 
No established 
supply chain so 
many options 
possible 
 Changes in supply 
chain population 
ecology have 
massive impact on 
producers and 
consumers; can lead 
to multilevel co-
evolution and 
changes in entire 
populations 
Changes in supply 
chain population 
ecology have massive 
impact on producers 
and consumers, can 
lead to multilevel co-
evolution and changes 
in entire populations 
Technology No established 
technology 
standards; many 
competing 
technologies 
Establishment of a 
dominant standard 
or architecture 
One dominant 
technology with 
suppliers mostly 
offering this 
Discontinuous change 
might mean market is 
replaced 
Behavioural 
norms  
No established 
market norms or 
behavioural 
norms for 
emerging 
companies 
Establishment of 
organisational and 
industrial norms for 
competing 
Established Norms and behaviours 
change due to 
reducing market 
demand 
Drivers for 
formation of 
strategic 
alliances 
Resources (small 
firms) 
Access to 
technology 
(larger firms) 
Access to 
markets 
 
Resource sharing 
Risk reducing 
 
Resource sharing 
Risk reducing 
Changing patterns 
within the supply 
chain 
Reduction in demand 
Requirement to lower 
costs 
Mechanisms 
of change 
predicted 
Firm- 
Environment 
Firm-firm 
Firm-alliance 
Co-evolution a 
stronger 
predictor than 
evolution (P1) 
Firm-Environment 
Evolution a 
stronger predictor 
than co-evolution 
since firms 
established with 
own strategic 
direction (P2) 
Firm-Environment 
Evolution a stronger 
predictor than co-
evolution since firms 
established with own 
strategic direction 
(P2) 
Firm-Environment 
Firm-Firm 
Firm-alliance 
Co-evolution 
occurring through 
strategic alliances; 
alliances essential to 
maintain viability (P3) 
Unit of Selection unit Unit of selection Growing trend for Multiple: Firms, 
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change and 
selection 
proposed 
variable and can 
include firms, 
dyads and 
networks (P1) 
more focused on 
individual firms 
(P2) 
selection to involve 
more than 1 firm (P2) 
dyads, supply chains, 
alliances.  (P3) 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The findings reported here are part of a wider research enquiry, exploring processes 
of strategic alliance formation and determinants and measures of successful relationships. 
The research examines the application of co-evolution theory to strategic alliance 
formation in SME‟s in the UK and Australia in two differing industries; namely the UK 
fresh produce industry and the Biotechnology industry in Australia. Extending the 
framework developed by Das and Teng [1], it engages with wider industry and 
environmental characteristics present in these two countries.  
 
The issues discussed above are explored and developed through the use of a 
qualitative case study approach, allowing an understanding of a „complex, holistic 
picture‟ [41]. Data was collected from secondary sources; extensive semi-structured 
interviews with one or more members of the senior management team of the UK and 
Australian businesses on site; participant observation in meetings with overseas partners 
in three European countries; and the use of records and follow-ups with one or more 
senior members of each business over a period of eight months.  The multiple sources of 
data typically used in case study research allow for a more holistic and in-depth 
understanding than other single method qualitative approaches [42] and encourage a 
more contextually based understanding of social phenomena  [43].  
The use of in-depth interviews allows the researcher to gain an insight into these 
factors in a way that could not be achieved through a quantitative survey, building up a 
picture of inter-connection rather than a list of single key factors.  The flexibility of semi-
structured interviews allows for the possibility of unspecified factors to emerge in the 
interviews and their importance to be discussed in depth. The sensitivity of the area of the 
research also informed the methodology.  Respondents were being asked in-depth 
questions about the purpose and scope of their strategic relationships with other 
companies; their selection criteria, operating procedures, goals and objectives; the costs 
and benefits of the alliances they were in, and how all this fitted into their current and 
future strategic operations. These are sensitive areas and have become increasingly so 
with the increased levels of competition. The information obtained from all respondents 
was only obtained after guarantees about the confidentiality of any disclosures; most of 
the interviews were conducted in a private office with only the researcher and the 
interviewee present. By using one-to-one in-depth interviews the researcher was able to 
develop a close rapport and build trust so that the interviewee was assured of 
confidentiality and was able to speak freely.  It is highly unlikely that the levels of 
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disclosure and the depth of information obtained would be obtained in a mail survey 
where this level of trust had not been engendered. Each interview varied in length, lasting 
between one to three hours. The interviews were conducted at the respondent‟s place of 
work.  Immediately after the interview, the taped transcripts were checked and the 
interview notes were read to ensure there were no areas of ambiguity or uncertainty.   
 
The samples for the UK and Australian interviews were chosen on a non-probability 
judgement basis.  The UK data was stratified in terms of geographical area and produce 
type to obtain a spread of producers across the country and covering the main produce 
types.  A range of firm size and ownership profiles was chosen.  In total 33 UK producers 
were contacted and 20 interviewed.  The Australian sample was selected after inviting all 
listed Biotechnology firms within Queensland. Many declined to be interviewed, and the 
final sample included 13 organisations which all gave interviews. Although a relatively 
small sample, this is consistent with other qualitative research samples [44]. Indeed, 
Patton [43] argues that “the validity, meaningfulness, and insights generated from 
qualitative inquiry have more to do with the information richness of the cases selected 
and the observational/analytical capabilities of the researcher than with sample size.”  
 
 
4. Industry Case Studies 
 
4.1 The Australian Biotechnology Industry – an emerging industry? 
 
The Queensland Government is committed to establishing the State as the centre 
of excellence in biotechnology in the Asia Pacific and will employ over 16,000 people 
and generate $4 billion in revenues to an industry worth $20 billion by 
2025. Queensland's biotechnology industry currently comprises around 88 companies and 
68 biotechnology-related research institutes.  Combined, these organisations employed 
over 5,200 people and generated an estimated $690 million in revenues in 2004/05 [45]. 
In addition, the “smart state” strategy encourages particular types of biotechnology 
industry; primarily those focused on human health, and several strategies have been put 
in place to encourage start-ups including cooperative networks, although the source of 
financing for most biotechnology companies in this region, remains commercial venture 
capitalists. However many start-ups are single product or service companies, and since 
the commercialisation of biotechnology products can be between 5 and 20 years after 
discovery, many small companies are found in these early development stages, the 
companies included in this study largely fell into this category. 
 
Most companies interviewed were small start ups with less than 10 employees; 
some were still incubator firms, but others had been around for longer. All had formed 
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strategic alliances. The ranged from R & D development projects, licensing in/out 
agreements, clinical trials at varying degrees, and upscaling to commercial production of 
new materials. Some alliances spanned marketing and finance as well, although these 
were less common. A strong recurring theme in this emerging industry dataset was the 
motivation of most alliance formation which was clearly in the majority of cases, purely 
resource driven. These small biotechnology firms did not have enough resources and 
actively sought out a range of strategic alliances including suppliers, collaborators and 
large companies who could act as guarantees of reputation/ quality that would then lead 
them to better outcomes in different ways; producing products, testing drugs; and raising 
venture capital. These firms all confirmed that they could not survive on their own and 
formed strategic alliances in order to survive; an example of this is:  
 
“In Australia, they [other companies] don’t have the resources to set up their own 
labs in general;  they are one man operations or two at best so they have to out-
source everything so therefore we are very good partners to work with”   
 
Every firm interviewed had multiple alliances and these had, by the nature of being 
involved in these alliances, changed the firms; in some instances they led to new alliance 
opportunities, showing evidence of co-evolution at several levels; between firms; 
between firms and the alliance; and between alliances, firms and the environment.  Some 
showed evidence of changing with their alliance partners over time, but others used 
alliances sparingly and for fixed portions of time to help with resource needs:   
 
Q: And do you think that relationship with X has led to other opportunities that you 
maybe would not have had without it? 
A: “Well it is interesting, they have actually brought some clients to [Firm A] and 
now that we are doing the bioanalyticals for [Firm A] we are actually now working 
more closely with [X] so we had an alliance with them, and another alliance with 
them,  and now we have got the three-way thing happening and it is interesting, 
[Firm A]  have a consultant who brings a lot of clients to them and now we are 
starting to work with their consultant as well, so it is interesting how things evolve.  
It starts off here but then it mushrooms”   
 
The need for survival was also expressed in other ways; some firms saw alliances 
as ways to increase their survival changes by “hedging their bets” on new emerging 
technologies:  
 
“Because you cannot pick the winners on early stage stuff you are better off 
actually having a very large portfolio (of alliances).  So we have found that by 
 11 
working with them they don’t want to invest in building a small team of their own 
because that is as much as their resource could be.” 
 
For other firms, being part of the “right” strategic alliance gave credibility to the 
company and they believed this would lead to increased Venture Capital (VC) funding 
opportunities. A slightly surprising driving force behind the structure of the firms, and the 
way in which they worked together or co-evolved was the pressure from VCs to exit the 
industry:  
 
“One of the other reasons for it is the venture capital industry here and they are 
very, very focused on exits, and they want exits within a five-year timeframe 
usually and at the very outside, somewhere between 5 and 10, and if you are 
doing pharmaceutical development then you are not going to get all that far in 5 
years …..It does not create large companies……  It is just all about money, it is 
all about investment, it is really not about long-term economic development at 
all” 
 
Given that evolution and co-evolution are about mechanisms to change, and 
adapting to the environment, the analogy given by these two theories fails to explain a 
common phenomenon in this industry; that is of having an exit strategy at a fairly early 
age of the company. However even when early exit was seen as the end point for a 
company, alliances were seen as a mechanism to achieve this, showing that in this 
industry co-evolving to form alliances and co-evolving to make these alliances worked 
ended in the end of one company through a merger to another:  
 
“The exit strategy for X is a trade sale and that will either happen in the next two 
years or X will disappear.  It is a finite end to the whole thing and we have the 
technology.  We have driven it about as far as it needs to go, we don’t do much in 
the way of R&D we just try to sell the product and we either do or we don’t.  I 
mean if we don’t then we will file the patent so to speak and keep it going for the 
moment but there is enough candles to keep the patents alive, because the 
technology may not be seen as desirable this year but it may be seen as desirable 
in a couple of years time”  
 
This dependence on venture capital was significant, but perhaps more so, in this 
particular industry was the difficulty in scaling up from discovery to testing (clinical 
trials) and then scaling up once more before commercialisation. The sheer scale of sizing 
up appears to be the impetus for exiting the industry and selling off the intellectual 
property. Another company said:  
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“But I think, you know, there are lots and lots of small companies for whom $1 
Million/$2 Million gets them a prototype and a proof of concept and another $5 
Million gets them convincingly close to the market and then they suddenly realise, 
you know what, to get manufacturing going and things like that we 
need$20/$30/$80 Million where are we going to find that.  Particularly in the last 
6-9 months, and I suspect for the next 6 months, you would not turn to the public 
markets for raising that money.  You really have to try to find a big company that 
is going, you know they are going to eat your lunch, but you know that is part of 
the deal you have gotta do.” 
 
This worked both for small biotechnology firms and the larger pharmaceutical 
firms that they partnered with; however it was clear that the respondent felt that the two 
firms did not “need” each other anymore; perhaps implying that there were stages of 
development which clearly showed co-selection but that this period was now passed. In 
this case the product in question had been through clinical trials and was reaching the 
commercialisation stages.  
 
“That is an interesting question.  I suppose it has because we probably don’t need 
them now as much as we did.  I mean they still don’t need us in the sense that they 
can survive without us, their product would stand on its own, it is not on the 
market yet but it probably will be in the not too distant future.  Our product does 
not need theirs anymore either but we would still prefer to go with them.  In other 
words of the options available now there are more than there were then but as it 
still happens that is the best plan for us, I suspect, to do it, not least because they 
are now with a really big pharma now, which suits us because that is eventually 
where we see our product as targeted” 
 
In summary, most if not all firms sought out alliances for mostly resource needs 
initially, although some subsequent alliances developed over time as a consequence of 
these initial alliances, and as a mechanism to try to change the selection process from 
firm to dyad. Most alliances showed changes over a period of time between the firms, the 
firm and the alliance, and the environment, the firm and the alliance. Sometimes this 
extended to locating and entering new alliances. Selection appeared to be early at the firm 
level – could the firm raise venture capital to continue or not? However some firms 
hinted that the relationships they had formed through alliances, increased the likelihood 
of gaining funding, and this showed a level of co-selection. The Biotechnology Industry 
within Australia is determined very much by its environment; the ability to seek funding 
and local government initiatives, and these external factors played a large role in 
determining which alliances were entered.  
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4.2 The UK Fresh Produce Industry – A mature / declining industry 
 
Changes in the UK retail food Industry over the last 20 years have had an 
important effect on the fresh produce sector in the UK with the emergence of a few key 
firms in the industry. The UK Fresh produce industry is now in a mature phase of the 
industry life cycle and the retail sector is dominated by 4 large firms: Tesco, Wal-Mart-
Asda, Sainsbury and Morrisons.  Tesco, the market leader has a 31% share of the market, 
followed by Wal-Mart-Asda at 17%, Sainsbury at 16% and Morrisons at 12%. These 
multiple retailers have increased their share of the total market year on year.  From 1994 
to 1999 their market share grew by 14% from 63% to 77% [46].  Although there has been 
changes in the share allocation between the big players in the industry, the actual market 
share of the top 4 multiple retailers in total has not changed by than 1-2% year on year 
over the last 10 years.  Thus the industry has seen slowing demand at an aggregate level 
but changes in the share of that demand.  The wholesale markets, traditionally the most 
important outlet for agricultural produce have decreased numerically and in relative 
importance [47]. By 2005 the dominant 3 retail chains accounted for 84% of all fresh 
fruit and vegetables sold in the UK [47].   
 
Supplier firms not who cannot obtain access to the network of customers and 
suppliers dominated through these 4 players, have come under significant competitive 
pressure and many have exited the industry and the total number of farm holdings in the 
UK and the area used for farming have been declining steadily. Overcapacity and poor 
returns in the sector has led to some rationalisation and a reduction in the number of firms 
over the last few years.  The total number of farm holdings fell from 60,600 in 2002 to 
53,800 in 2008 [48]. This was accompanied by a fall in total production area from 3.25 
million acres in 2002 to 2.67 million acres in 2007 [48]. Only 13% of fruit growers and 
7% of vegetable growers had sales of £1 million or more in that year and only 5 fruit and 
60 vegetable growers had sales of more than £5 million.  Whilst these larger growers 
were responsible for a disproportionate amount of total output in the industry, the 
majority of farm holdings in horticulture are small, specialist businesses, often operating 
on a regional basis for production and often specialising in particular areas of the market. 
The outcome of this is that each product area is dominated by a few large companies 
despite the numerically dominant small-scale holdings.     
 
A large number of strategic alliance between growers (40%) were between firms who had 
had prior trading relationships, which then developed into an alliance.  Twelve others 
included firms learning about their potential existing partners through other existing 
trading relationships, such as wholesalers, suppliers of equipment and seed, agents and 
importers.  None of the firms had had previous alliances with their partner, although this 
is largely to do with the fact that most firms had little alliance activity before these 
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current alliances.  Where alliances had been formed, these were largely seen as a survival 
mechanism of mutual dependence.  The alliance itself also became a new organisational 
form, so whilst the firms still saw themselves as disparate entities in terms of their 
identity, they regarded the alliance as a form in its own right, as noted: 
 
“There is great symbiosis.  Both parties are as dependent on each other for things 
to work.” 
 “Our partnership is an entity in its own right, separate from both ours and our 
partners’ business….” and 
 
The need for co-evolutionary change was described as the “flexibility” of the 
alliance to change with the changing objectives, resources and relative power of the 
partners was also a significant determinant of alliance success, as cited by others [23,49, 
50]:  
 
“The best alliances are unstructured, loose, not written down, but based on 
mutual trust and acceptance of each-others’ position, point of view and efforts.  
That is what we have.” and 
 
“Our supplier has a business now that is worth 4 times what it was 3 years ago 
and it is still growing.  Both of us are now very dependent on each other.” 
 
In three alliances the partners were looking for a significant increase in integration 
between the partner firms through investigating the options for a joint venture and one 
firm was actually in the process of setting up a joint venture.  This can be explained as 
either an evolutionary process for the alliance, or a co-evolutionary process of the two 
firms. In these cases this change in structural form was driven by a need for increased 
control over the day to day running of the relationship: 
 
“We have decided that we need to be growing in Spain.  We are not seeing the 
improvements in cultural practices coming through as quickly as we would like.  
The reason we are doing it with (partner firm) is in part a hand-holding exercise.  
(Partner firm) have experience of what is going down in Spain and for the first 
few years it will be much better if we have them showing us the ropes…there are 
things that happen in Spain that wouldn’t happen in other countries.” 
 
Where there were changes in the environment, alliances could falter. An example 
of this was changing requirements during supply seasons.  For most of the year the source 
of product was clearly defined by the growing conditions in the countries concerned.  
Therefore the period when the UK partner needed their alliance partner to supply product 
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was clearly demarcated.  However, technological improvements in growing and storage 
techniques have meant that the crossover periods from end of season in one country and 
beginning of season in another are becoming increasingly blurred and longer in duration.  
This has meant that at these times alliance partners were both growing product that they 
wanted to supply to their end customer and therefore the dependence on each other has 
changed. The alliance between the two firms needed to change or co-evolve in this 
instance with changes in the environment: 
 
“The key factor that is likely to affect our relationship is the ever lengthening 
seasons.  We [Firm B] want to grow longer into the autumn and start earlier and 
our partners want to continue longer into the traditional UK summer season and 
start earlier in the autumn.  This is likely to become a bigger issue.” 
 
The balance of needs was also affected when the focal firm was no longer 
necessary to provide the key resource driver for the partner firm, notably access to the 
UK market.  Two firms had had experience of their partners trying to cut them out of the 
supply chain.  For both of them this had led to the end of the alliance relationships: 
 
“Partnerships can go wrong.  We have had lots of experience of suppliers sending 
product to a more profitable customer or claiming not to have a crop.  Trust is 
crucial.” 
 
In summary, the alliances in the fresh fruit industry showed a high degree of 
integration between the partner firms.  The alliances formed to try to change the unit of 
selection, and as a mechanism for firm survival. Partners inputted resources and worked 
together on a continuing basis, evolving at both the alliance level, which often changed 
from its initial objectives and also resulting in changes within the originating firms.  This 
shows simultaneous co-evolution between the firm and the alliance, and the firm and 
partner firm supporting Das & Teng‟s [1] definition of co-evolution as different parts of a 
system evolving simultaneously and interacting with each other so that one partner‟s 
evolution is affected by another partner‟s evolution.  In common with the biotechnology 
industry, there is evidence of these alliances evolving out of other relationships and these 
alliances themselves evolving both in terms of structure and of scope over time. The 
strongest driving force was environmental and firms reacted to environmental change by 
forming alliances, thus showing a degree of co-evolution.  The alliance relationships also 
co-evolved in terms of scope and operations and in some instances in terms of new 
emerging structures, quite separate from those of the two firms.  In this mature / declining 
industry, co-evolution through alliance formation and during the alliance lifespan was 
seen as a survival mechanism and the unit of selection was therefore changed to be the 
dyad, rather than the single firm.   
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This study set out to examine the ways in which firms form, perform, compete and 
change within alliance relationships, using two case study examples as rich in-depth 
perspectives of industries at different life cycle stages.  
 
Within the emerging industry of Queensland Biotechnology, the industry and 
National norms appear to have predefined life cycles for this industry sector: instead of 
building companies that commercialise one product, and then move onto the next, the 
structure seems to define that companies establish, form alliances, co-evolve for a period 
of time, leverage the alliances and then find an exit strategy; this in some ways 
contradicts the underpinnings of the industry life cycle which suggests there is a shakeout 
based on market effectiveness and efficiencies. It would appear that firms in fact are 
established only to exist through this emerging industry period. During this time they are 
wholly dependent on the co-evolution of alliances; and are indeed selected largely by the 
results of their alliance participation.  The need to use strategic alliances to survive the 
first emerging stage of product, market or company growth was clear. No single firm 
contacted could work alone. Whilst the case study supports P1 and co-evolution as an 
explanatory of change, the unit of selection is less clear.  Without the alliances the 
companies would have failed immediately as they lacked resources; yet it is unclear in 
this study whether the dependence on any one firm resulted in co-selection.  
 
The instability of these alliances support others findings [2,54].  Koza and Lewin [2] 
argue that at this early stage of the industry lifecycle this instability reflects the higher 
risks of exploration and high failure rates, but also importantly, the successful conclusion 
of alliance formation strategy, as is seen here.  In this way the dissolution of the alliance 
is not a reflection of failure, rather the success of the individual firm and alliance goals.  
In the biotechnology industry these alliances were conceived as a relatively short-term 
strategic form to get a conceptual idea to the next stage of development.  Furthering the 
concept of (in)stability, these alliances actually had dissolution built into them.  Thus 
supporting findings from Koza and Lewin [2], the instability of these alliances were 
“endemic to their strategy, structure and functioning”. 
 
Biotechnology is an industry with characteristics common to other high-technology 
industries; because there are few direct competitors in the start-up stage and the 
development stages are long and costly [51]. Selection is a long term process, and to get a 
single drug to market might take many strategic alliances, mergers and / or acquisitions, 
so determining whether the firms working together had been selected together would 
require longitudinal and complex data. This issue with legitimacy and establishing order 
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in emerging industries is common [51,52].  In developing this model, the paper 
challenges the claim by McKelvey [53], that co-evolution can only take place where the 
population of firms consists of heterogeneity as firms in this case study were of differing 
size and experience. 
 
For the fresh produce industry, an industry at a mature and arguably declining stage; 
the firms interviewed are those remaining after a shakeout; many small firms have 
already exited the industry or have been forced to find alternative channels for their 
product.  Alliances were being formed initially as a mechanism for survival, but once 
formed, the alliance became an essential part of the firm, which not only saw co-
evolution occurring between firms but between firms and alliances.  Co-evolution was 
seen in terms of scope and operations and in some instances in terms of new emerging 
structures, quite separate from those of the two firms.  The individual firm strategy and 
the strategic intent for the alliance were seen to co-evolve with changes in the wider 
industry environment supporting the findings of Koza and Lewin [54]. Supporting Arino 
and de la Torre [55], co-evolution occurred at the levels of firm and alliance strategy and 
as a result of feedback from alliance outcomes, the strategy of the individual firms 
changed. 
 
In most cases there was a strong commitment to the strategic alliance with a sense 
that this was a structural form that could stay as such for an indefinite period.  This 
stability of alliance form is surprising given extant research as discussed above that 
argues that alliances are inherently unstable.  In this later stage of the industry lifeycle, 
alliance instability has been found to be due to increasing divergence in the strategic 
goals of the alliance partners over time [2,54,56] and indeed in the few cases where 
alliances had ended or were in the process of ending it was due to a change in the balance 
of resource needs between alliance partners and ensuing divergence in strategic goals.  
However the overwhelming positive feelings towards alliances in the fresh produce 
industry suggests that firms which made the co-evolutionary change to alliances 
succeeded and this was confirmed by the views of the firms themselves who attribute 
their success to the alliance. Therefore overall there was support for both elements of P3 
in that in this declining industry, evidence of co-evolutionary change and co-selection 
was seen.  
 
These findings are summarised in Table 2, which builds on the framework developed 
in Table 1 and summarises the findings of this study. Clearly in these two case studies, 
the mechanism of selection had become more than individual firms, the strong 
dependence on alliances suggests a co-dependence best described by co-evolution rather 
than evolution. The findings show strong resource-based drivers for alliance formation in 
both industries under study.  Firms were shown to be dependent on the co-evolution of 
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their alliances for their continued existence and indeed were selected by the results of 
their alliance participation.  However, this study also shows differences in the strategic 
use of alliances in these industries.  For the firms in the fresh produce industry co-
operation through alliances was a key determinant of survival.  Firms survived because 
they changed together and a co-evolution strategy was seen to reduce risk and increase 
survival rates.  Co-evolution of firms in this industry can be shown to be occurring at 
multiple levels with changes in scope and structure and in some cases new evolving 
structures quite separate to the two firms in the alliance.  In the biotechnology industry 
co-operation was evident by multiple strategic alliances.  It was typified by many small 
firms who formed alliances to access resources and achieve legitimacy.  The nature of 
being in these alliances changed the firms yet the ways they used these alliances differed.  
Some showed evidence of co-evolving, yet others used alliances sparingly and for fixed 
portions of time to help with resource needs. 
 
Table 2 summary of Results 
 Introduction Growth Maturity Decline 
Mechanisms 
of change 
predicted 
Firm- Environment 
Firm-firm 
Firm-alliance 
Co-evolution a 
stronger predictor 
than evolution (P1) 
Firm-Environment 
Evolution a stronger 
predictor than co-
evolution since 
firms established 
with own strategic 
direction (P2) 
Firm-Environment 
Evolution a stronger 
predictor than co-
evolution since 
firms established 
with own strategic 
direction (P2) 
Firm-Environment 
Firm-Firm 
Firm-alliance 
Co-evolution 
occurring through 
strategic alliances; 
alliances essential 
to maintain 
viability (P3) 
Unit of 
change and 
selection 
proposed 
Selection unit 
variable and can 
include firms, dyads 
and networks (P1) 
Unit of selection 
more focused on 
individual firms 
(P2) 
Growing trend for 
selection to involve 
more than 1 firm 
(P2) 
Multiple: Firms, 
dyads, supply 
chains, alliances.  
(P3) 
Mechanisms 
of change 
seen 
Firm-Environment 
Firm – Firm 
Firm- Alliance 
Not studied Not studied Firm-Environment 
Firm – Firm 
Firm- Alliance 
Mechanism of 
selection 
Firms trying to 
change unit of 
selection to dyadic – 
therefore co-
selection and co-
evolution present 
P1 supported 
n.a. n.a. Firms trying to 
change unit of 
selection to dyadic 
– therefore co-
selection and co-
evolution present 
P3 supported 
 
As noted above, extant management theories have been derived from relatively mature 
manufacturing industries where firms largely compete on an individual basis and are 
selected for on this basis. This study examined how, and why, firms in emerging and 
declining industry sectors form and change within strategic alliances. The findings 
support the idea that co-evolution and co-selection appear to provide a better explanation 
of firm behaviour that the more traditional approach of evolution and survival of the 
fittest.   
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6. Limitations and Future Research  
 
The two industries in this paper came from differing countries, and were both 
relatively small sample sizes. In addition, the mature middling stages of the life cycle 
were not addressed. Further research should look at more industries to see if the patterns 
here were in large, determined by the environment that these firms operated in, or 
whether the life stage of the industry is, as this study suggests a significant factor in 
evolutionary and co-evolutionary behaviour. The integration of the lifecycle stage of 
either the firm or the industry should be further examined to determine if there are 
generalisable patterns of competition and selection and to determine if evolution or co-
evolution is a better explanatory for firm survival; this would allow strategy 
determination to account for the simultaneous change between firms, their environment 
and if appropriate their cooperative partners.  
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